Question 1 · choose 1
Your support agent may change a customer's account email only after verify_identity has confirmed the caller. The system prompt says so in capital letters, yet audit logs show that about one conversation in fifty calls update_account_email without a successful verification. Security wants this to never happen. What should you change?
- ARepeat the rule at the end of the system prompt, where recent instructions carry more weight
- BAdd few-shot examples to the system prompt that show verify_identity always being called before the email change
- CMake update_account_email reject any call that lacks a token issued by a successful verify_identity
- DLower the temperature of the agent's requests so that Claude follows the documented verification steps more consistently
Show the answer and why
ARepeat the rule at the end of the system prompt, where recent instructions carry more weight
Incorrect
Moving or repeating a prompt instruction changes the odds, not the guarantee; the instruction is already being ignored at times.
BAdd few-shot examples to the system prompt that show verify_identity always being called before the email change
Incorrect
Examples make the right order more likely but remain guidance, so some rate of skipped verification remains.
CMake update_account_email reject any call that lacks a token issued by a successful verify_identity
Correct
A gate in the tool layer holds on every call, whatever Claude decides, which is what a requirement of zero violations needs.
DLower the temperature of the agent's requests so that Claude follows the documented verification steps more consistently
Incorrect
Sampling settings do not turn an instruction into a rule; the model can still skip the step.
Prompt instructions have a non-zero failure rate. When an order of steps is a hard requirement, such as identity verification before an account change, put a programmatic prerequisite in front of the protected action.
Anthropic documentation