SC-500 · Domain 1: Manage identity, access, and governance · 24% of the exam
Task 1.1: Secure access to resources by using Microsoft Entra ID
Privileged Identity Management, Conditional Access, MFA and passwordless methods, enterprise applications and app registrations, OAuth permission grants and consent, and managed identities for Azure resources.
Study it
Privileged Identity Management for Entra and Azure resource roles
Lesson coming
Conditional Access policies and authentication strengths
Lesson coming
MFA and passwordless authentication methods
Lesson coming
Enterprise applications, app registrations, permission grants and consent
Try each one before opening the answer. Every option is explained, with the Microsoft documentation page that proves it.
Question 1 · choose 1
An engineer must get Key Vault Administrator on the production key vault kv-pay-prod only after activating it, for up to two hours at a time. A deployment pipeline's user-assigned managed identity needs Key Vault Secrets Officer on the same vault at all times. The vault's Access control (IAM) page doesn't offer the Eligible assignment type, and no one may get access beyond this vault. What should you do?
AMake both the engineer and the managed identity eligible in PIM, and have the pipeline activate its role before each run
BCreate the engineer's eligible assignment on the vault in PIM under Azure resources, and give the managed identity an active assignment
CCreate the engineer's eligible assignment on the resource group's IAM page, where the Eligible type is offered
DGive the engineer a permanent active assignment on the vault and require MFA for Azure management in Conditional Access
Show the answer and why
AMake both the engineer and the managed identity eligible in PIM, and have the pipeline activate its role before each run
Incorrect
Eligible assignments can't be created for service principals or managed identities, because they can't perform the activation steps.
BCreate the engineer's eligible assignment on the vault in PIM under Azure resources, and give the managed identity an active assignment
Correct
PIM can create eligible assignments at resource scope, which the IAM page can't, and a managed identity can't perform activation, so it needs an active assignment.
CCreate the engineer's eligible assignment on the resource group's IAM page, where the Eligible type is offered
Incorrect
The IAM page offers eligible assignments at resource group scope, but the role would then cover every vault in the group.
DGive the engineer a permanent active assignment on the vault and require MFA for Azure management in Conditional Access
Incorrect
A permanent active assignment is standing access; the engineer would never need to activate the role.
With PIM, the Access control (IAM) page can create eligible assignments at management group, subscription and resource group scope, but not at resource scope, so an eligible assignment on a single vault is made in PIM. Eligible assignments are for users: applications, service principals and managed identities can't perform the activation steps, so the pipeline's identity gets an active assignment.
You have Workload Identities Premium licenses. A Conditional Access policy should block the single-tenant service principal Billing-Export from getting tokens outside the company's named locations. The policy includes the security group Automation-SPs, of which Billing-Export is a member, targets All resources and blocks access. Sign-in logs show Billing-Export still getting tokens from an unknown IP address. What should you change?
AChange the grant control to require multifactor authentication for the service principal
BTarget Microsoft Graph instead of All resources, because All resources skips app-only tokens
CReplace Billing-Export with a user-assigned managed identity so that the policy covers it
DAssign Billing-Export to the policy directly as a selected service principal
Show the answer and why
AChange the grant control to require multifactor authentication for the service principal
Incorrect
A service principal can't do MFA; for workload identities, Block access is the only grant option.
BTarget Microsoft Graph instead of All resources, because All resources skips app-only tokens
Incorrect
All resources is the documented target, and the policy applies whenever the service principal requests a token.
CReplace Billing-Export with a user-assigned managed identity so that the policy covers it
Incorrect
Managed identities aren't covered by Conditional Access policies at all.
DAssign Billing-Export to the policy directly as a selected service principal
Correct
A policy assigned to a group that contains a service principal isn't enforced for it; the service principal must be assigned directly as a workload identity.
Conditional Access for workload identities applies to single-tenant service principals registered in your tenant and needs Workload Identities Premium licenses. Service principals can be group members, but a policy assigned to such a group isn't enforced for them: include the service principal itself under Select service principals. Block access is the only grant control, and managed identities are out of scope.
A scheduled job on an Azure VM runs Azure PowerShell as the user account svc-deploy, signing in with a password kept in a file, to create and delete resources in one resource group. Since mandatory MFA for Azure reached Azure PowerShell, the job fails. It must keep running unattended, security won't exclude any account from MFA, and no credential may be stored on the VM. What should you do?
ARun the job as the VM's managed identity, with a role on the resource group
BRegister a FIDO2 passkey for svc-deploy and keep the security key plugged in to the VM
CChange the job to use only Get cmdlets, which mandatory MFA doesn't cover
DCreate an app registration and keep its client secret in the file instead of the password
Show the answer and why
ARun the job as the VM's managed identity, with a role on the resource group
Correct
Workload identities such as managed identities aren't affected by mandatory MFA, and the VM gets their tokens without a stored credential.
BRegister a FIDO2 passkey for svc-deploy and keep the security key plugged in to the VM
Incorrect
Completing a passkey sign-in needs a person, so the job couldn't run unattended.
CChange the job to use only Get cmdlets, which mandatory MFA doesn't cover
Incorrect
Read operations don't require MFA, but the job has to create and delete resources.
DCreate an app registration and keep its client secret in the file instead of the password
Incorrect
A client secret in a file is still a credential stored on the VM, which security forbids.
Phase 2 of mandatory MFA, from October 1, 2025, requires MFA for Azure CLI, Azure PowerShell, IaC tools and REST calls that create, update or delete resources. User accounts used as service accounts must then complete MFA; Microsoft recommends moving them to workload identities, which neither phase affects. A managed identity on the VM needs no stored secret.
Users consented to a third-party multitenant app that now appears to exfiltrate mail. Security wants Microsoft Entra ID to stop issuing tokens for the app in your tenant immediately, while its enterprise application, user assignments and granted permissions stay as they are for the investigation. What should you do?
ADeactivate the app's registration under App registrations
BSet Enabled for users to sign in to No in the app's enterprise application properties
CDelete the app's enterprise application
DRevoke the admin-consented permissions on the app's Permissions page
Show the answer and why
ADeactivate the app's registration under App registrations
Incorrect
The app registration lives in the publisher's tenant, so you can't deactivate it from yours.
BSet Enabled for users to sign in to No in the app's enterprise application properties
Correct
This sets the service principal's accountEnabled to false, which prevents all tokens from being issued for the app while keeping its configuration.
CDelete the app's enterprise application
Incorrect
Deleting removes the enterprise application from use instead of keeping its configuration in place for the investigation.
DRevoke the admin-consented permissions on the app's Permissions page
Incorrect
Revoking removes the granted permissions that must stay in place, and it doesn't stop the app from signing users in.
Disabling user sign-in for an enterprise application sets its service principal's accountEnabled property to false in your tenant, so no tokens are issued for the app; the configuration stays and the Activation status shows Deactivated. Deactivating the app registration disables the app across all tenants, but only the home tenant can do that.
You're creating a Conditional Access policy that requires phishing-resistant MFA and targets the Windows Azure Service Management API resource. Which two sign-ins does the policy apply to? (Choose TWO.)
AAn engineer signing in to Azure CLI
BAn engineer running Microsoft Graph PowerShell to list users
CAn engineer signing in to Azure DevOps
DAn engineer running Azure PowerShell cmdlets against Azure Resource Manager
EA pipeline's managed identity calling Azure Resource Manager
Show the answer and why
AAn engineer signing in to Azure CLI
Correct
Azure CLI is one of the services grouped under this resource.
BAn engineer running Microsoft Graph PowerShell to list users
Incorrect
Microsoft Graph PowerShell calls Microsoft Graph, which this resource doesn't cover.
CAn engineer signing in to Azure DevOps
Incorrect
Policies on this resource no longer cover Azure DevOps.
DAn engineer running Azure PowerShell cmdlets against Azure Resource Manager
Correct
The resource applies to Azure PowerShell, which calls the Azure Resource Manager API.
EA pipeline's managed identity calling Azure Resource Manager
Incorrect
Managed identities aren't covered by Conditional Access policies.
Targeting Windows Azure Service Management API enforces the policy for tokens issued to services closely bound to the portal, including Azure Resource Manager, Azure CLI and Azure PowerShell. It doesn't apply to Microsoft Graph PowerShell or Azure DevOps, and Conditional Access never evaluates managed identities.
A Bicep loop adds four federated identity credentials to the same user-assigned managed identity, and the deployment fails with HTTP 409 Conflict errors. What should you change?
ASplit the credentials across two identities, since one identity holds at most two
BCreate the credentials one after another, for example with dependsOn
CAdd the same subject to all four credentials
DGrant the deployment identity Managed Identity Operator
Show the answer and why
ASplit the credentials across two identities, since one identity holds at most two
Incorrect
An identity can hold up to 20 federated credentials.
BCreate the credentials one after another, for example with dependsOn
Correct
Concurrent creation under one user-assigned identity triggers conflict detection, so they must be created sequentially.
CAdd the same subject to all four credentials
Incorrect
The issuer and subject combination must be unique on the identity.
DGrant the deployment identity Managed Identity Operator
Incorrect
The failure comes from concurrent updates, not missing permissions.
Creating multiple federated identity credentials under the same user-assigned managed identity at the same time causes 409 conflict failures. Create them sequentially: set a loop to serial mode or chain them with dependsOn. Credentials under different identities can be created in parallel.
An auditor wants a PowerShell list of the eligible Azure role assignments in a subscription. Which cmdlet returns them?
AGet-AzRoleAssignment
BGet-AzRoleAssignmentSchedule
CGet-AzRoleEligibilitySchedule
DGet-AzRoleDefinition
Show the answer and why
AGet-AzRoleAssignment
Incorrect
That lists role assignments without their eligibility schedules.
BGet-AzRoleAssignmentSchedule
Incorrect
That lists active assignment schedules, such as active time-bound assignments.
CGet-AzRoleEligibilitySchedule
Correct
It returns eligible role assignments for the scope.
DGet-AzRoleDefinition
Incorrect
That lists role definitions, not who is eligible for them.
No single PowerShell command lists both eligible and active time-bound assignments. Get-AzRoleEligibilitySchedule lists eligible assignments, and Get-AzRoleAssignmentSchedule lists active assignments, which you can filter to those with an end date.
An administrator deleted an enterprise application by mistake yesterday. How long can it be restored from the recycle bin?
A30 days after deletion
B7 days after deletion
C90 days after deletion
DIt can't be restored; it must be added again
Show the answer and why
A30 days after deletion
Correct
Soft-deleted enterprise applications can be restored within the first 30 days.
B7 days after deletion
Incorrect
The restore window is longer than a week.
C90 days after deletion
Incorrect
The application is hard deleted well before that.
DIt can't be restored; it must be added again
Incorrect
A deleted enterprise application stays in a suspended state and can be restored.
A deleted enterprise application remains in a suspended state in the recycle bin for 30 days, during which it can be restored; after that it's permanently deleted. Microsoft suggests considering deactivation before deletion when you need to keep the configuration.
An auditor asks how the credential behind a managed identity is rotated and who rotates it. What's the answer?
AThe resource owner must rotate a client secret every 90 days
BKey Vault rotates a key for the identity on a schedule you set
CThe credential never expires, because tokens are issued by IMDS
DAzure uses a certificate that expires after 90 days and rolls it after 45 days
Show the answer and why
AThe resource owner must rotate a client secret every 90 days
Incorrect
Managed identities don't use client secrets that anyone rotates.
BKey Vault rotates a key for the identity on a schedule you set
Incorrect
The credential isn't stored in or rotated by your key vault.
CThe credential never expires, because tokens are issued by IMDS
Incorrect
IMDS hands out tokens, but the underlying credential expires.
DAzure uses a certificate that expires after 90 days and rolls it after 45 days
Correct
Managed identities use certificate-based authentication managed by Azure.
Managed identities use certificate-based authentication. Each identity's credential expires after 90 days and is rolled after 45 days, without any action by the resource owner.