KCSA · Domain 1: Overview of Cloud Native Security · 14% of the exam
Task 1.1: The 4Cs of Cloud Native Security
Cloud, cluster, container and code as layers of defense, what each layer protects and why an inner layer cannot make up for a weak outer one.
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The 4Cs: cloud, cluster, container and code
Lesson coming
Sample questions
Try each one before opening the answer. Every option is explained, with the CNCF documentation page that proves it.
Question 1 · choose 1
A platform team already limits Pod privileges with Pod Security Standards. A penetration test still shows that after a container escape the attacker found compilers, package managers and many running services on the team's general-purpose Linux nodes. Following the compute protection advice in Kubernetes' cloud native security overview, what should change at the node layer?
AMove each team's workloads into its own namespace so that an escape reaches only that team's node view
BEnable encryption at rest for API objects so that data reachable from the node cannot be read
CRun a container-specific operating system from a read-only image that ships only what containers need
DTighten the Pod Security Standard to Restricted in every namespace so that escapes stop happening
Show the answer and why
AMove each team's workloads into its own namespace so that an escape reaches only that team's node view
Incorrect
Namespaces group API objects; Pods from many namespaces still share the same nodes, so a namespace does not change what an attacker finds on the host.
BEnable encryption at rest for API objects so that data reachable from the node cannot be read
Incorrect
Encryption at rest protects API data stored in etcd. It does not remove tools or services from the node operating system that an escaped process can use.
CRun a container-specific operating system from a read-only image that ships only what containers need
Correct
The page recommends a specialized, typically immutable, operating system for nodes: it isolates system components and presents a reduced attack surface in case of a container escape.
DTighten the Pod Security Standard to Restricted in every namespace so that escapes stop happening
Incorrect
Restricted lowers the chance of an escape, but the finding is about what the host offers once an escape has happened, which the page addresses with a minimal node operating system.
Runtime protection for compute in the Kubernetes cloud native security overview lists Pod Security Standards and, separately, a container-specific node operating system built from a read-only image. The second reduces what an attacker can use on the host after a breakout, which is the gap the test found.
A payments team encrypts sensitive fields inside its application before writing them to cluster volumes. Its policy says the encryption keys must never exist in a form that an administrator could copy off a machine. What does the storage part of Kubernetes' cloud native security guidance suggest for generating and using these keys?
AA hardware security module, which uses the key without ever letting it be copied
BA Kubernetes Secret that holds the key, mounted read-only into the application's Pods
CAn EncryptionConfiguration file on the control plane hosts that the API server reads at start-up
DA key file built into the application's container image
Show the answer and why
AA hardware security module, which uses the key without ever letting it be copied
Correct
The guidance says generating keys within specialized hardware gives the best protection against disclosure, and that a hardware security module performs cryptographic operations without allowing the key to be copied elsewhere.
BA Kubernetes Secret that holds the key, mounted read-only into the application's Pods
Incorrect
A Secret's value can be read by anyone allowed to read the Secret and by the node that runs the Pod, so the key can still be copied.
CAn EncryptionConfiguration file on the control plane hosts that the API server reads at start-up
Incorrect
That file holds a locally managed key on the host. The encryption-at-rest task notes this fails to protect against a host compromise, and the key can be copied from the file.
DA key file built into the application's container image
Incorrect
Anyone who can pull the image can extract the file, so the key can be copied; the guidance points to hardware that performs the operations without releasing the key.
For keys that must not be disclosed, the runtime storage section of the cloud native security overview points to keys generated in specialized hardware: a hardware security module performs the operations while the key itself never leaves it. Keys kept in API objects or files remain copyable.
Kubernetes' overview of cloud native security says that containers provide two things, and that because of them runtime security means finding a balance between trade-offs. Which two things?
AEncryption of data and authentication of users
BIsolation between applications and a way to run them together on one host
CAutomatic scaling and self-healing of workloads
DImmutable images and signed provenance for every build
Show the answer and why
AEncryption of data and authentication of users
Incorrect
Containers do not encrypt data or authenticate users; the overview treats those as separate controls.
BIsolation between applications and a way to run them together on one host
Correct
The overview says containers provide isolation between applications and a mechanism to combine those isolated applications on the same host computer, which is why runtime security involves trade-offs.
CAutomatic scaling and self-healing of workloads
Incorrect
Scaling and self-healing come from Kubernetes controllers, not from the container mechanism the overview describes.
DImmutable images and signed provenance for every build
Incorrect
Image immutability and signing are supply chain properties, not the two things the overview says containers provide.
The overview describes containers as providing isolation between applications and a mechanism to combine isolated applications on one host. Isolation and aggregation pull in different directions, so protecting compute at runtime means choosing an appropriate balance between them.
Under runtime protection for storage, which practice does Kubernetes' cloud native security overview list for the connections between cluster nodes and the network storage they use?
AAllow the storage network only through NodePort Services
BMount network storage only through hostPath volumes
CAuthenticate node connections to the network storage
DRun the storage traffic over the same network as the API server
Show the answer and why
AAllow the storage network only through NodePort Services
Incorrect
NodePort Services expose workloads to clients; they are not a control for node-to-storage connections.
BMount network storage only through hostPath volumes
Incorrect
hostPath mounts a node path into a Pod and carries its own risks; it does not secure the storage connection.
CAuthenticate node connections to the network storage
Correct
The overview lists authenticating connections between cluster nodes and any network storage they rely on.
DRun the storage traffic over the same network as the API server
Incorrect
Sharing a network does not authenticate either side of the connection.
For storage, the overview recommends storage plugins with encryption at rest, encryption at rest for API objects, tested backups, authenticated connections between nodes and network storage, and encryption inside applications.