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KCSA · Domain 3: Kubernetes Security Fundamentals · 22% of the exam

Task 3.4: Authorization

Authorization modes, RBAC Roles, ClusterRoles and bindings, aggregation, escalation-prone verbs and checking access with kubectl auth can-i.

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  • Authentication and authorization with RBAC

    Lesson coming

Sample questions

Try each one before opening the answer. Every option is explained, with the CNCF documentation page that proves it.

Question 1 · choose 1

A team lead holds a Role in namespace web that allows create on rolebindings and full access to Deployments and Services, and nothing else. The lead tries to create a RoleBinding in web that binds a colleague to the built-in admin ClusterRole, and the API server refuses. Which grant would let the lead create that binding without receiving the permissions in admin?

  1. Aget and list on clusterroles, so that the API server can confirm admin's rules
  2. Bcreate on clusterrolebindings, since the escalation check applies only to RoleBindings
  3. Cupdate on clusterroles, so that the lead can trim admin before binding it
  4. DThe bind verb on the admin ClusterRole
Show the answer and why
  • Aget and list on clusterroles, so that the API server can confirm admin's rules

    Incorrect

    Reading a role grants none of its permissions and is not the bind permission, so the escalation check still refuses the binding.

  • Bcreate on clusterrolebindings, since the escalation check applies only to RoleBindings

    Incorrect

    The same rule applies to ClusterRoleBindings: the creator needs the referenced role's permissions or the bind verb.

  • Cupdate on clusterroles, so that the lead can trim admin before binding it

    Incorrect

    Editing a role is itself limited by escalation prevention, and changing the shared admin role would affect every binding to it.

  • DThe bind verb on the admin ClusterRole

    Correct

    A role binding can be created only by someone who already holds all permissions of the referenced role at that scope or who is authorized to use the bind verb on that role.

RBAC prevents escalation through bindings: you can create or update a role binding only if you already have every permission in the referenced role, at the binding's scope, or have the bind verb on that role. Granting bind on the admin ClusterRole permits the binding without handing the lead those permissions directly.

Question 2 · choose 1

A team installs a CustomResourceDefinition for backups.example.com. Users bound to the built-in view ClusterRole must be able to get and list backups, with no change to their bindings. An engineer proposes adding the rule directly to the view ClusterRole. What should be done instead?

  1. AEdit view anyway, after annotating it so that API server auto-reconciliation leaves it alone
  2. BAdd the backup rules to the existing system:aggregate-to-view ClusterRole
  3. CCreate a ClusterRole with the backup rules and the label rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-view: "true"
  4. DAdd an aggregation rule to the CustomResourceDefinition that selects the view ClusterRole
Show the answer and why
  • AEdit view anyway, after annotating it so that API server auto-reconciliation leaves it alone

    Incorrect

    view is built by aggregation, and the control plane overwrites manually specified rules of an aggregated ClusterRole with the rules it selects.

  • BAdd the backup rules to the existing system:aggregate-to-view ClusterRole

    Incorrect

    That is a default role, which auto-reconciliation restores on API server restart, so manual changes to it are lost.

  • CCreate a ClusterRole with the backup rules and the label rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-view: "true"

    Correct

    view is an aggregated ClusterRole; the control plane adds the rules of every ClusterRole carrying that label to it.

  • DAdd an aggregation rule to the CustomResourceDefinition that selects the view ClusterRole

    Incorrect

    aggregationRule is a field of ClusterRole; a CustomResourceDefinition has no such field.

Default user-facing roles such as view, edit and admin are aggregated ClusterRoles. To extend them for a custom resource, create a separate ClusterRole labeled rbac.authorization.k8s.io/aggregate-to-view: "true" (or -edit, -admin); its rules are combined into the default role, and nobody's binding changes.

Question 3 · choose 1

A user needs rights in only one namespace. What do the Kubernetes RBAC good practices recommend for granting them?

  1. AA RoleBinding, which gives the rights only within that namespace
  2. BA ClusterRoleBinding, so that the rights also cover future namespaces
  3. CA ClusterRoleBinding to the built-in cluster-admin role
  4. DA wildcard rule on all resources in that namespace
Show the answer and why
  • AA RoleBinding, which gives the rights only within that namespace

    Correct

    The good practices say to assign permissions at the namespace level where possible, using RoleBindings rather than ClusterRoleBindings.

  • BA ClusterRoleBinding, so that the rights also cover future namespaces

    Incorrect

    A ClusterRoleBinding grants the rights in every namespace, broader than the user needs.

  • CA ClusterRoleBinding to the built-in cluster-admin role

    Incorrect

    That grants full rights across the whole cluster, far more than one namespace needs.

  • DA wildcard rule on all resources in that namespace

    Incorrect

    The good practices advise avoiding wildcard permissions where possible.

Least privilege in RBAC starts with scope: grant rights at the namespace level with RoleBindings wherever possible, avoid wildcards, and keep cluster-wide bindings for the cases that need them.

Question 4 · choose 1

What does the AlwaysAllow authorization mode do, and when does the Kubernetes documentation say to use it?

  1. AIt allows read requests only; use it for monitoring users
  2. BIt allows all requests; use it only when authorization is not needed
  3. CIt allows requests that RBAC has already allowed; use it together with RBAC
  4. DIt blocks all requests; use it for testing
Show the answer and why
  • AIt allows read requests only; use it for monitoring users

    Incorrect

    AlwaysAllow allows every request, reads and writes alike.

  • BIt allows all requests; use it only when authorization is not needed

    Correct

    The authorization page says AlwaysAllow allows all requests, which brings security risks, and should be used only if you do not require authorization.

  • CIt allows requests that RBAC has already allowed; use it together with RBAC

    Incorrect

    It allows everything; combined with RBAC it makes RBAC ineffective because nothing is ever denied.

  • DIt blocks all requests; use it for testing

    Incorrect

    That describes AlwaysDeny.

AlwaysAllow bypasses authorization entirely, and even listed together with other modes it allows anything they have no opinion on. The documentation limits it to cases where authorization is not required, such as testing.

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