Try each one before opening the answer. Every option is explained, with the HashiCorp documentation page that proves it.
Question 1 · choose 1
An attacker copied a full backup of a Vault cluster's integrated storage data directory but has no access to the cloud KMS key that the cluster uses for auto unseal. What can the attacker read from the copy?
AEvery KV secret, because integrated storage writes values to disk in plaintext
BAll of the data, because with auto unseal the root key is kept in the storage backend without any encryption
CSecret values but not tokens, because only token data passes through the barrier
DNo secret values, because they are encrypted by the keyring, whose root key only the KMS key can decrypt
Show the answer and why
AEvery KV secret, because integrated storage writes values to disk in plaintext
Incorrect
Storage backends are untrusted by design; everything leaving the barrier is encrypted with AES-256-GCM.
BAll of the data, because with auto unseal the root key is kept in the storage backend without any encryption
Incorrect
The root key is stored alongside the data only in encrypted form; with auto unseal the trusted KMS decrypts it at startup.
CSecret values but not tokens, because only token data passes through the barrier
Incorrect
All data Vault writes to storage passes through the barrier, secrets included.
DNo secret values, because they are encrypted by the keyring, whose root key only the KMS key can decrypt
Correct
The barrier encrypts data before it reaches storage; the keyring is protected by the root key, which auto unseal keeps encrypted with the KMS key.
Vault encrypts data with keys in its keyring, the keyring with the root key, and the root key with the unseal key or, under auto unseal, a KMS or HSM key. Storage alone yields only ciphertext.