Try each one before opening the answer. Every option is explained, with the CNCF documentation page that proves it.
Question 1 · choose 1
A SaaS provider gives each tenant its own set of nodes, using taints and node selectors so that no two tenants' Pods share a node, while all tenants still use one cluster control plane. According to the Kubernetes multi-tenancy guide, which risk does node isolation alone leave in place?
ANoisy-neighbor contention for node resources between tenants becomes worse than before
BA container escape still gives direct access to the containers of other tenants running on the same node
CThe kubelet and API server are still shared, so an attacker could use their permissions to move laterally
DPer-tenant billing becomes harder to work out than with sandboxed containers
Show the answer and why
ANoisy-neighbor contention for node resources between tenants becomes worse than before
Incorrect
The guide says node isolation reduces the noisy tenant issue, because all Pods on a node belong to one tenant.
BA container escape still gives direct access to the containers of other tenants running on the same node
Incorrect
With node isolation every Pod on a node belongs to one tenant, so an escape reaches only the containers and volumes on that tenant's node.
CThe kubelet and API server are still shared, so an attacker could use their permissions to move laterally
Correct
The guide warns that with node isolation the kubelet and the API server are still shared services, which a skilled attacker could use to move laterally to other tenants' workloads.
DPer-tenant billing becomes harder to work out than with sandboxed containers
Incorrect
The guide says node isolation is easier to reason about from a billing standpoint than sandboxing.
Node isolation dedicates nodes to one tenant, which limits what an escape exposes and reduces noisy neighbors. The multi-tenancy guide still flags shared services: the kubelet and the API server can be used to move laterally, and suggests compensating controls if that matters.
A team loads a custom AppArmor profile on its nodes and applies it to a container. Tests show that file writes the profile should forbid still succeed, while the system log records each violation. What explains this?
AThe container must set allowPrivilegeEscalation to false before AppArmor rules take effect
BAppArmor filters only system calls, so blocking file writes needs a seccomp profile instead
CThe container also needs an SELinux label before an AppArmor profile can block anything
DThe profile is loaded in complain mode, which reports violations without blocking them
Show the answer and why
AThe container must set allowPrivilegeEscalation to false before AppArmor rules take effect
Incorrect
allowPrivilegeEscalation controls the no_new_privs flag. AppArmor profiles are applied through the container's AppArmor profile setting, independently of that field.
BAppArmor filters only system calls, so blocking file writes needs a seccomp profile instead
Incorrect
Seccomp is the syscall filter. AppArmor is a mandatory access control module that restricts access to resources such as files through per-program profiles.
CThe container also needs an SELinux label before an AppArmor profile can block anything
Incorrect
SELinux is a separate Linux security module. An AppArmor profile does not depend on SELinux labels to enforce its rules.
DThe profile is loaded in complain mode, which reports violations without blocking them
Correct
The security checklist says each AppArmor profile runs either in enforcing mode, which blocks access to disallowed resources, or in complain mode, which only reports violations.
AppArmor profiles have two modes. In enforce mode the kernel blocks what the profile disallows; in complain mode it only logs. A profile that logs every violation yet lets the writes through is running in complain mode.
Which Linux kernel security feature works by assigning security labels to objects for more manageable policy enforcement?
Aseccomp
BAppArmor
CSELinux
DLinux capabilities
Show the answer and why
Aseccomp
Incorrect
seccomp filters which system calls a process can make.
BAppArmor
Incorrect
AppArmor restricts the access privileges of individual programs through profiles.
CSELinux
Correct
The Kubernetes page on kernel security constraints describes SELinux as assigning security labels to objects for more manageable security policy enforcement.
DLinux capabilities
Incorrect
Capabilities divide root privileges into separate units that can be granted or dropped.
Kubernetes can use three kernel security modules and features: seccomp for syscall filtering, AppArmor for per-program access restrictions and SELinux for label-based policy, each configured through the securityContext.
In the Kubernetes multi-tenancy guide, what does the term "hard" multi-tenancy usually describe?
AStrong isolation, often for tenants that do not trust each other
BTenants that share one namespace with separate RBAC roles
CA cluster that has one dedicated tenant per node pool and no other controls
DTenants that are all teams of the same company
Show the answer and why
AStrong isolation, often for tenants that do not trust each other
Correct
The guide says hard multi-tenancy implies strong isolation and is often used where tenants do not trust each other.
BTenants that share one namespace with separate RBAC roles
Incorrect
Sharing a namespace gives weak boundaries; the guide calls weaker isolation soft multi-tenancy.
CA cluster that has one dedicated tenant per node pool and no other controls
Incorrect
Node pools are one technique; the term describes the strength of isolation, not a specific setup.
DTenants that are all teams of the same company
Incorrect
Multi-team tenancy describes who the tenants are, not how strong the isolation is.
The guide contrasts "hard" multi-tenancy, strong isolation typical when tenants do not trust each other, with "soft" multi-tenancy, weaker isolation, while noting there is no single definition of either term.