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KCSA · Domain 5: Platform Security · 16% of the exam

Task 5.1: Supply Chain Security

Securing source, build and delivery: provenance, signed artifacts, SBOMs, pinned dependencies and verifying what gets deployed.

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Sample questions

Try each one before opening the answer. Every option is explained, with the CNCF documentation page that proves it.

Question 1 · choose 1

A company's CI service builds application images for many teams on shared build servers. A new pipeline must build infrastructure images with tooling that needs elevated privileges, and one application team handles card payment data. What does the CNCF Cloud Native Security Whitepaper recommend for the build infrastructure?

  1. AKeep all builds on the shared servers and sign every image so that tampering shows later
  2. BRun privileged infrastructure builds on dedicated CI servers and isolate CI by sensitivity
  3. CRun the privileged builds on the shared servers inside rootless containers
  4. DScan the privileged pipeline's images more often, since scanning protects the build hosts
Show the answer and why
  • AKeep all builds on the shared servers and sign every image so that tampering shows later

    Incorrect

    Signing protects artifacts after the build; it does not keep a privileged build from affecting other teams' builds on the same server.

  • BRun privileged infrastructure builds on dedicated CI servers and isolate CI by sensitivity

    Correct

    The whitepaper says CI servers should be restricted to projects of similar security classification or sensitivity, and builds needing elevated privileges should run on separate dedicated CI servers.

  • CRun the privileged builds on the shared servers inside rootless containers

    Incorrect

    Changing how the engine runs on the shared servers does not meet the whitepaper's recommendation of separate dedicated servers for builds that need elevated privileges.

  • DScan the privileged pipeline's images more often, since scanning protects the build hosts

    Incorrect

    The whitepaper notes that scanning provides evidence of vulnerabilities but does not remediate them or prevent malware.

The whitepaper's build pipeline guidance isolates CI by sensitivity and moves infrastructure builds that require elevated privileges onto separate dedicated CI servers, so a compromise of one build cannot easily reach builds of a different classification.

Question 2 · choose 1

During a breach, the key a build system uses to sign artifacts may have been exposed, and artifacts signed with it can no longer be trusted. What does the CNCF Cloud Native Security Whitepaper say teams should do with the signing keys?

  1. AKeep them, and rescan every artifact they signed for known vulnerabilities
  2. BEncrypt the affected images so that their contents stay confidential
  3. CRevoke them, so that the untrusted artifacts no longer verify as trusted
  4. DStore them as Kubernetes Secrets so that only the API server can use them
Show the answer and why
  • AKeep them, and rescan every artifact they signed for known vulnerabilities

    Incorrect

    Scanning finds known vulnerabilities; it says nothing about whether an attacker signed a tampered artifact with the exposed key.

  • BEncrypt the affected images so that their contents stay confidential

    Incorrect

    Image encryption protects confidentiality; it does not withdraw trust from signatures made with an exposed key.

  • CRevoke them, so that the untrusted artifacts no longer verify as trusted

    Correct

    The whitepaper says that should software artifacts become untrusted due to a compromise, teams should revoke signing keys.

  • DStore them as Kubernetes Secrets so that only the API server can use them

    Incorrect

    Moving an exposed key does not make it secret again; trust in what it signed has to be withdrawn.

Signatures are only as trustworthy as the signing key. When a compromise makes signed artifacts untrusted, the whitepaper's guidance is to revoke the signing keys, and it separately recommends protecting such keys with HSMs or credential managers.

Question 3 · choose 1

Where does the CNCF Cloud Native Security Whitepaper say build policies should be enforced?

  1. AOnly in developers' local editors
  2. BIn the CI pipeline and by the orchestrator's admission controllers
  3. COnly in the container runtime on each node
  4. DOnly in the registry's web interface
Show the answer and why
  • AOnly in developers' local editors

    Incorrect

    Local checks help, but the whitepaper places enforcement in the pipeline and at admission.

  • BIn the CI pipeline and by the orchestrator's admission controllers

    Correct

    The whitepaper says build policies should be enforced in the CI pipeline and by the orchestrator's admission controllers.

  • COnly in the container runtime on each node

    Incorrect

    The runtime runs containers; the whitepaper names the CI pipeline and admission controllers for build policies.

  • DOnly in the registry's web interface

    Incorrect

    The registry is not where the whitepaper says build policies are enforced.

Enforcing build policies twice, once in CI and again when workloads are admitted to the cluster, means an artifact that skipped a pipeline check can still be stopped before it runs.

Question 4 · choose 1

For the security of the software supply chain, what does Kubernetes' cloud native security overview say software distribution should use?

  1. APlain HTTP, so that proxies can cache the artifacts
  2. BEncryption in transit, with a chain of trust for the software source
  3. CShared credentials that every team can use to publish
  4. DImages referenced by the latest tag, so that security fixes arrive quickly
Show the answer and why
  • APlain HTTP, so that proxies can cache the artifacts

    Incorrect

    Unencrypted transfer allows tampering on the way; the overview asks for encryption in transit.

  • BEncryption in transit, with a chain of trust for the software source

    Correct

    The overview lists ensuring that software distribution uses encryption in transit, with a chain of trust for the software source.

  • CShared credentials that every team can use to publish

    Incorrect

    Shared publishing credentials weaken the chain of trust instead of establishing it.

  • DImages referenced by the latest tag, so that security fixes arrive quickly

    Incorrect

    Moving tags make it harder to know what is deployed; the overview asks for a trusted, encrypted distribution path.

Supply chain guidance for distribution includes encrypted transport with a chain of trust for the source, so that consumers can confirm where software came from and that it was not altered on the way.

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