Question 1 · choose 1
In a company's pipeline, the build, test and vulnerability scan stages are run by three different teams with their own tools. Auditors require verifiable evidence, for every image that reaches production, that each of the three stages ran on that exact image, and the promotion to production must stop by itself when a stage was skipped. Which approach does the CNCF Cloud Native Security Whitepaper describe for this?
- ASign the image manifest once at the end of the pipeline and verify that signature at deployment
- BEach stage writes the image digest and its result to a shared database; promotion needs all three rows
- CEach stage records and signs metadata about its work, and later stages verify it before continuing
- DThe promotion job asks each team's tool whether a run for the image's tag passed
Show the answer and why
ASign the image manifest once at the end of the pipeline and verify that signature at deployment
Incorrect
One signature shows that a single signer vetted the artifact; the whitepaper notes that real supply chains rely on several validation steps, and one signature does not show which of them ran.
BEach stage writes the image digest and its result to a shared database; promotion needs all three rows
Incorrect
The rows are bound to the image but signed by no one: anyone with write access to the database can add a row for a stage that never ran, so later stages have nothing to verify.
CEach stage records and signs metadata about its work, and later stages verify it before continuing
Correct
The whitepaper says supply chain tools can gather and sign build pipeline metadata so that later stages verify the signatures to validate that the prerequisite stages have run; CNCF describes in-toto as a framework to protect supply chain integrity.
DThe promotion job asks each team's tool whether a run for the image's tag passed
Incorrect
A tag can be moved to point to a different image, so a passed run for the tag does not show that the stage ran on the exact image promoted, and the tools' answers are not signed evidence.
Evidence that required pipeline steps happened comes from signed metadata: each stage records and signs what it did, and later stages verify that the prerequisite stages ran before they proceed, which also stops promotion automatically. A single artifact signature indicates one vetting; unsigned records and answers about a movable tag can be forged or point at another image. in-toto is the CNCF framework built to protect supply chain integrity this way.
CNCF documentation