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KCSA · Domain 6: Compliance and Security Frameworks · 10% of the exam

Task 6.3: Supply Chain Compliance

Attesting how software was built: provenance, SBOMs, signatures and policies that admit only compliant artifacts.

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  • Compliance, threat modeling and supply chain frameworks

    Lesson coming

Sample questions

Try each one before opening the answer. Every option is explained, with the CNCF documentation page that proves it.

Question 1 · choose 1

In a company's pipeline, the build, test and vulnerability scan stages are run by three different teams with their own tools. Auditors require verifiable evidence, for every image that reaches production, that each of the three stages ran on that exact image, and the promotion to production must stop by itself when a stage was skipped. Which approach does the CNCF Cloud Native Security Whitepaper describe for this?

  1. ASign the image manifest once at the end of the pipeline and verify that signature at deployment
  2. BEach stage writes the image digest and its result to a shared database; promotion needs all three rows
  3. CEach stage records and signs metadata about its work, and later stages verify it before continuing
  4. DThe promotion job asks each team's tool whether a run for the image's tag passed
Show the answer and why
  • ASign the image manifest once at the end of the pipeline and verify that signature at deployment

    Incorrect

    One signature shows that a single signer vetted the artifact; the whitepaper notes that real supply chains rely on several validation steps, and one signature does not show which of them ran.

  • BEach stage writes the image digest and its result to a shared database; promotion needs all three rows

    Incorrect

    The rows are bound to the image but signed by no one: anyone with write access to the database can add a row for a stage that never ran, so later stages have nothing to verify.

  • CEach stage records and signs metadata about its work, and later stages verify it before continuing

    Correct

    The whitepaper says supply chain tools can gather and sign build pipeline metadata so that later stages verify the signatures to validate that the prerequisite stages have run; CNCF describes in-toto as a framework to protect supply chain integrity.

  • DThe promotion job asks each team's tool whether a run for the image's tag passed

    Incorrect

    A tag can be moved to point to a different image, so a passed run for the tag does not show that the stage ran on the exact image promoted, and the tools' answers are not signed evidence.

Evidence that required pipeline steps happened comes from signed metadata: each stage records and signs what it did, and later stages verify that the prerequisite stages ran before they proceed, which also stops promotion automatically. A single artifact signature indicates one vetting; unsigned records and answers about a movable tag can be forged or point at another image. in-toto is the CNCF framework built to protect supply chain integrity this way.

Question 2 · choose 1

What does the CNCF Cloud Native Security Whitepaper strongly recommend before changes can be introduced to images in registries or code is committed to repositories?

  1. AAnonymous access with rate limits
  2. BA shared deploy key for all teams
  3. CMutual authentication
  4. DApproval by email after the change is made
Show the answer and why
  • AAnonymous access with rate limits

    Incorrect

    Anonymous changes cannot be attributed to anyone, the opposite of the recommendation.

  • BA shared deploy key for all teams

    Incorrect

    A shared key does not authenticate individual parties.

  • CMutual authentication

    Correct

    The whitepaper strongly recommends that repositories require mutual authentication to introduce changes to images in registries or to commit code to repositories.

  • DApproval by email after the change is made

    Incorrect

    After-the-fact approval does not control who can introduce changes.

Supply chain integrity depends on knowing who changed code or images. The whitepaper asks for mutual authentication on registries and code repositories before changes are accepted.

Question 3 · choose 1

The CNCF Cloud Native Security Whitepaper lists several kinds of artifact signing. Which kind covers signing application config files?

  1. AContainer image signing
  2. BConfiguration file signing
  3. CPackage signing
  4. DCommit squashing
Show the answer and why
  • AContainer image signing

    Incorrect

    Container image signing signs a container image manifest.

  • BConfiguration file signing

    Correct

    The whitepaper defines configuration file signing as signing a config file, such as application config files.

  • CPackage signing

    Incorrect

    Package signing covers a package of artifacts, such as application packages.

  • DCommit squashing

    Incorrect

    Squashing combines commits; it is not a signing method.

The whitepaper's signing examples are container image signing (the image manifest), configuration file signing (for example application config files) and package signing (packages of artifacts).

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